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Abstract The choice of the exchange rate regime is one of the most signifi cant monetary 
policy decisions that any economic authority has to make nowadays. Indeed, there have been 
many studies from a theoretical and empirical point of view, but the only common conclusion 
would be the lack of consensus. In the past this topic has been modeled by binary probit or 
cross-sectional multinomial logit models, both of which have weaknesses in the assumptions of 
the choices. In this paper, such issue is faced by means of a panel mixed multinomial logit 
model, which allows for substitution pattern among the three types of exchange rate regimes: 
fi xed, intermediate, and fl exible. Three types of choice determinants are explored: those stated 
by the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory, types of shocks and vulnerability to currency 
crises, using a sample of 21 Latin American countries over the period 1980-2004.
© 2011 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
Determinantes de la elección del régimen cambiario en América Latina: 
una aproximación a un modelo logit multinomial mixto
Resumen La elección del régimen cambiario constituye una de las decisiones de política 
económica más relevantes a las que se enfrentan las autoridades monetarias de cualquier país. 
Existe una amplia literatura, tanto teórica como empírica, cuyo principal resultado es la falta de 
consenso acerca de los determinantes de la elección del régimen cambiario. Tradicionalmente, 
este problema se había tratado mediante modelos probit binarios o modelos logit multinomiales 
de corte transversal, presentando ambos debilidades en la estimación. En este artículo, esta 
cuestión se afronta mediante un modelo logit multinomial con datos de panel que permite la 
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Crisis Cambiarias;
Logit multinomial 
mixto
correlación de los errores en el tiempo, así como una mayor fl exibilidad en la elección de las 
alternativas. Se analizan tres tipos de determinantes en la elección de régimen cambiario: 
aquellos que se derivan de la teoría de las Áreas Monetarias Óptimas, los relativos a los tipos de 
shocks y los que se refi eren a la propensión a las crisis cambiarias, utilizando una muestra de 21 
países de América Latina para el periodo 1980-2004.
© 2011 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos 
reservados.
1. Introduction
The choice of the exchange rate regime is one of the most 
relevant economic decisions that any economic authority 
has to face nowadays. No wonder therefore, a wide 
literature, both theoretical and empirical, has arisen in 
order to identify the most important factors that determine 
and explain this decision.
From the theoretical point of view, the fi rst arguments 
are derived from the Optimum Currency Area theory 
(OCA), formulated by Mundell (1961), which points out 
the advantages of fixed exchange rates regimes in small 
and open countries, with a high level of trade with those 
countries to which they peg their currency.
The reformulation of Mundell-Fleming model by Poole 
(1970) indicated that the nature of the shocks —real or 
monetary, external or internal— determines the role of 
exchange rates and, consequently, the reasons for choosing 
a determined exchange rate regime.
During the 80’s, the literature on credibility and time 
inconsistency (Barro and Gordon, 1983; and Giovazzi and 
Pagano, 1988) inspired the processes of stabilization and 
the choice of exchange rate as nominal anchor.
The explicit introduction of a decision-maker agent in the 
models opened the door to a new line of work identifi ed with 
political economy, in which the regime choice is related to 
the characteristics of the institutions and the incentives of 
the decision-maker (Edwards, 1996).
The last decade of the twentieth and early twenty-fi rst 
century witnessed a process of fi nancial liberalization and 
strong exchange rate turbulences. In this context, the 
analyses have focused on the limitations imposed by the 
“impossible trinity” (Eichengreen, 1994) to the choice of 
exchange rate regime and its aftermath of “fear of fl oating” 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), “original sin” (Eichengreen and 
Hausmann, 2003) or the succession of fi nancial crises (Calvo, 
1998).
The empirical literature has followed the cycles marked 
by theoretical work, trying to test the empirical relevance 
of the variables identified in the theoretical models. 
Thus, the early works (Heller, 1978; Dreyer, 1978) used as 
explanatory variables those related to optimum currency 
areas. Subsequent works incorporated also characteristics 
of shocks (Savvides, 1993; Melvin, 1985; Collins, 1996). 
In the mid-90’s of last century, variables referring to 
characteristics of institutions and the political system began 
to be included (Leblang, 1999; Edwards, 1996; Méon and 
Rizzo, 2002). Finally, recent works have added variables 
related to financial openness and contrast a long list of 
variables that take into account the different theoretical 
aspects (Wong, 2005; Carmignani et al., 2008). However, 
the results of this literature have been disappointing.
In a previous study (Alvarez et al., 2007) we have reviewed 
41 papers in this fi eld of research, extending and updating 
the survey of Juhn and Mauro (2002). In line with these 
authors, the main conclusion of our survey is the lack of a 
consensus with regard to the factors that affect the choice 
of a certain exchange rate regime. This is clearly observed 
in Table 1, which shows the main explanatory variables 
used in the 41 reviewed studies and the empirical fi ndings 
with regard to the probability that such variables are 
signifi cant and positively correlated with the choice of a free 
fl oating or a fl exible exchange rate regime. Table 1 shows 
that only one variable, the size of the economy, presents 
a clear infl uence in the choice of a fl exible exchange rate 
regime along the 41 examined papers.
There are several reasons that may explain this fact 
(Álvarez Ondina et al., 2007). The fi rst explanation takes 
into account the classifi cation of exchange rate regimes. 
Many authors use the classification provided by the IMF. 
Since many problems come up with this classifi cation, other 
alternatives as Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) or Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003) are also commonly used. Levy-Yeyati et 
al. (2010) used a broad set of the most widespread variables 
in this literature and different methods of classifying 
exchange rate regimes, without finding many significant 
differences between them.
A second possible explanation for the diversity in results is 
the sample and the explanatory variables choices. Measures 
for exchange rate regime determinants are especially 
diverse in the literature, due to the fact that there are 
many different defi nitions. For instance, this is the case of 
proxies for political instability.
Another problematic matter is related to the state-
dependence effect. Traditional approaches consider that 
the choice of the exchange rate regime takes place in each 
period. Nonetheless, a more appropriate approach states 
that once the choice has been made, it will be kept until 
signifi cant changes in the independent variables take place. 
In other words, the regime in each period is highly correlated 
with the past choice. The inclusion of such issues in the 
model may potentially be problematic in the estimation.
Some other problems arise from possible multicollinearity 
between regressors, non-stationary time series, and the 
simultaneous estimation of long-term and short-term 
variables.
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It is also important to take into account the differences 
in the econometric techniques. Given the nature of the 
dependent variable, discrete choice models (logit and 
probit) are mostly used. While some of these models impose 
strict independence among the choices, exchange rate 
regime classifi cation into fi xed, intermediate, and fl exible 
is not always a clear issue.
Nonetheless, recent econometric developments have 
led to more flexible models such as the mixed logit 
model which is characterized by two key features: on the 
one hand, it allows for the correlation of errors across 
time, choice, and unit of analysis (country, in this case); 
and, on the other hand, it makes possible to relax the 
assumption of independence among the choices imposed 
by standard logit models (Hensher et al., 2003). This latter 
characteristic makes this model especially appealing 
for the analysis of exchange rate regime determinants 
since it seems to better adapt to the real context of 
the choices made by countries. Hence, countries with a 
current fl oat regime seem to be more likely to switch to 
an intermediate rather than a fi xed regime, or vice versa.
For all this, the mixed logit model is the modelling strategy 
adopted in this paper in order to examine the impact of 
several macroeconomic factors on the choice of exchange 
rate regimes in Latin American countries. Following Von Hagen 
and Zhou (2007) and Wong (2005), the mixed logit model is 
adapted to the case of a multinomial choice between fi xed, 
intermediate and fl exible exchange rate regimes. Our analysis 
differs from these two previous works in both the area (Latin 
American countries —a relatively homogeneous group— versus 
a sample of developing nations) and period of study (our 
analysis extents to 2004 while the other two papers end in 
1999). Moreover, each theory is tested independently in this 
paper, avoiding the accumulation of explanatory variables.
In particular, we test the infl uence of three types of choice 
determinants: those stated by the Optimum Currency Area 
Table 1 Survey of explanatory variables in empirical literature (a positive coeffi cient indicates a trend towards a fl exible 
exchange rate regime)
Explanatory variables Positive* (+) Negative (−) Non-signifi cant Total
Optimum Currency area 
 Theory Factors
Openness 12 19 10 41
Economic development 10 5 6 21
Size of the economy 21 2 5 28
Infl ation differential 5 2 5 12
Capital mobility 0 4 3 7
Geographical trade concentration 5 9 7 21
International fi nancial integration 5 2 4 11
      
Other factors (macro, 
 external and estructural)
Growth 4 3 1 8
Negative growth 1 1 0 2
Infl ation 8 3 4 15
Moderate to high infl ation 2 4 0 6
Reserves 4 9 10 23
Capital control 4 5 6 15
Terms of trade volatility 3 2 4 9
Variability in export growth 2 0 0 2
External variability openness 0 1 0 1
Real exchange rate volatitlity 3 2 1 6
Product diversifi cation 3 3 3 9
Current account 2 3 1 6
External debt 5 6 0 11
Growth of domestic credit 5 4 1 10
Money shocks 2 3 1 6
Foreign price shocks 2 0 1 3
Financial development 4 4 1 9
Fiscal balance 0 2 0 2
Central government balance 0 0 2 2
      
Historical and political 
 factors
Political instability 10 1 4 15
Central bank independence 1 0 1 2
Party in offi ce has majority 2 4 0 6
Number of parties in coalition 1 0 1 2
Coalition government 1 0 2 3
Political regime (Dem/Dic) 4 1 2 7
Electoral system (proportional / M) 2 0 0 2
Expansive fi scal policy 0 1 0 1
Source: Álvarez Ondina et al. (2007).
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(OCA) theory, types of shocks and vulnerability to currency 
crises.
Finally, we use a panel data approach rather than 
cross-section in order to take into account the state 
dependence effect that, otherwise, will not be captured.
In the next section, the mixed logit model is briefly 
described, followed by data sources. Then estimation 
results are presented and, fi nally, we draw some conclusions 
and make some suggestions for future research.
2. Modelling framework: a mixed logit 
approach
In this paper, a mixed multinomial logit model is used in order 
to assess the determinants of the choice among the three 
following exchange rate regimes: fl exible, intermediate, and 
fi xed. As Von Hagen and Zhou (2007) and Wong (2005) point 
out the main advantages of this model, compared to the 
standard logit, are the twofold: on the one hand, it allows 
for correlation of errors across time, choice, and country, 
which makes the model appealing for discrete choice 
situation in a macroeconomic setting with panel elements; 
and, on the other hand, it relaxes the Independence from 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption and then allows for 
some substitution between exchange rate regimes.
Consider a sample of N countries (i = 1, …,N), each of 
one facing a choice among J alternatives of exchange 
rate regimes (Yit = J, where J = 0, 1, 2, which respectively 
indicate fi xed, intermediate, and fl exible regimes) in each 
of T periods (t = 1, 2,... T). Country i is assumed to consider 
the full set of alternatives and choose the one with the 
highest utility, which can be written as follows:
P (Yit = J) = P (Uitj > Uitk) j, k = 0, 1, 2 and j ≠ k (1)
Uitj = jxit + uitj (2)
uitj = ij + itj (3)
where j is the vector of coeffi cients to be estimated, xit 
is the vector of explanatory variables, and uitj is the error 
terms split in two elements: itj is a random term with zero 
mean and independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) 
over countries, time, and regimes; while ij is a random 
term with zero mean which represents cross-country and 
regime-specifi c unobserved characteristics and is assumed 
to be i.i.d across countries and constant over time. In 
particular ij is supposed to follow a bivariate normal 
distribution with covariance matrix  = ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠
s11 s12
s21 s22
 .
To account for the dynamic linkage in regime choices the 
following dynamic model is specifi ed:
Uitj = jxit + ktid + uitj, k = 1, 2 (4)
uitj = ij + itj (5)
where d represents the dummy for either the lagged 
intermediate or lagged fl exible regime. 1
Assuming an i.i.d. Type I extreme value distribution for 
itj and denoting the density of ij by f (ij), the probability 
of regime choice j, given ij and the vector xit of exogenous 
variables, could be written as:
Pijt = ⌠⌡ij P (Yit = j |ij, xit) f (ij) d ij (6)
where P (Yit = j |ij, xit) = exp(xit + ij)/[1 + ∑jexp(xit + ij)] 
j = 1, 2, 0 = 0 (7)
This kind of models is known as mixed logit models 
because the choice probability Pijt is a “mixture of outcome 
of logit models with f as the mixing distribution” (Hensher 
and Greene, 2003). The integral in equation (6) does not 
have a closed form in general, therefore simulation will be 
used.
The idea of simulation is to draw random numbers from 
the distribution that is being integrated over, that is, rij. 
Then, for each draw P (Yit = j |rij, xit) is calculated. Once 
this process has been repeated R times, the average of the 
resulting P (Yit = j |rij, xit) will be taken as an approximation 
of Pijt:
Pijt * = 1/R∑ P (Yit = j |rij, xit)
As R → ∞, the law of large numbers indicates that 
that average would be a consistent estimate of the true 
probabilities (Wong, 2005).
3. Data
In this study we use panel data set of 21 Latin American 
countries for the period 1980-2004. 2 With regard to the 
dependent variable we follow the IMF classifi cation (IMF, 
2004), distinguishing three types of exchange rate regime: 
fixed, intermediate, and flexible. The definition of the 
explanatory variables together with data sources are 
shown in Table 2. In particular, we test the influence of 
three types of choice determinants: those stated by the 
optimum currency area (OCA) theory, types of shocks and 
vulnerability to currency crises.
4. Results
Tables 3-5 show the results of the estimation of the models. 
The fi rst important consideration lies in the crucial role of 
the previous exchange rate regime choice to explain the 
current regime, since lagged dependent variables (d1 and 
d2) are statistically signifi cant in all the estimations.
Table 3 presents the results for the Optimum Currency 
Area Theory model. We fi nd that the variables “size of the 
economy” and “openness” are both statistically signifi cant 
with positive sign. Therefore, those countries with higher 
levels of Gross Domestic Product per capita and openness 
(measured as the sum of imports and exports of goods as 
1. The dummy for lagged fi xed intermediate is excluded in order 
to avoid the perfect multicollinearity problem.
2. Our sample of countries consists of the following: Argentina, 
 Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay 
and Venezuela.
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a percentage of GDP) are more likely to choose flexible 
exchange rate regimes. It is important to take into account 
that the positive sign of “openness” contrasts the OCA 
theory.
With respect to the types of shocks (Table 4), only those 
regarding the current account turn out to be signifi cant. The 
positive sign indicates a larger tendency to fl exibility in the 
case of current account defi cit.
Table 5 presents the results for the model that includes 
the variables related to the vulnerability to crises. A fi rst 
point to highlight is that the existence of currency crises 
in previous periods increases the tendency to fl exibility, 
whereas the variable that represents the fear to float, 
that is “external debt”, shows its infl uence in the opposite 
direction, with a negative sign. A second interesting point 
is the signifi cant negative impact of the variable “money 
Table 2 Explanatory variables
Variables Code Defi nition Source
State 
 dependency
Intermediate 
 regime in t-1
d1 dummy variable that takes value 1 in the case 
 of intermediate regime in the previous period
Own elaboration
Flexible regime 
 in t-1
d2 dummy variable that takes value 1 in the case 
 of fl exible regime in the previous period
Own elaboration
     
Optimum 
 Currency 
 area Theory
Size of economy lgdp Logarithm of GDP IFS/IMF
Openness openness (Exports + Imports)/GDP IFS/IMF
Trade concentration xshare Share of total exports to 3 largest trading partners EIU
     
Types of Shocks Current Account cacc Current Account Balance/GDP IFS/IMF
Infl ation inf Average annual infl ation rate IFS/IMF
Nominal effective 
 exchange rate
neer Nominal effective exchange rate standard deviation 
 in the last 3 years
IFS/IMF
Terms of trade toftrade Terms of trade Annual Variation EIU
     
Vulnerability 
 to exchange 
 rate crises
Fiscal balance fb Fiscal balance IFS/IMF
External Debt fxdebt External Debt /GDP IFS/IMF
External Debt 
 (% exports)
netfxexp Net External Debt /exports EIU
M2/GDP M2gdp Money supply/GDP IFS/IMF
Currency crisis crisis dummy variable that takes value 1 in the case of crisis 
 episodes defi ned following Frankel and Rose (1996)
Own elaboration
Table 3 Latin America, 1980-2004. Optimum currency area theory
Regime Coef. Std. Err. z P > z [95 % Conf. Interval]
Intermediate  −3.61098 0.91466 −3.95 0.000 −5.40367 −1.81829
lgdp 0.27982 0.09171 3.05 0.002 0.10006 0.45957
openness 0.00247 0.00125 1.97 0.048 0.00002 0.00493
xshare −0.00977 0.01172 −0.83 0.405 −0.03273 0.01320
d1 5.24328 0.51826 10.12 0.000 4.22751 6.25906
d2 2.84351 0.58912 4.83 0.000 1.68886 3.99816
        
Flexible  −5.18942 1.03643 −5.01 0.000 −7.22078 −3.15805
lgdp 0.15100 0.09690 1.56 0.119 −0.03892 0.34092
openness 0.00350 0.00145 2.42 0.015 0.00067 0.00634
xshare 0.01291 0.01179 1.09 0.274 −0.01020 0.03602
d1 4.13936 0.73155 5.66 0.000 2.70554 5.57318
d2 6.27356 0.70154 8.94 0.000 4.89858 7.64855
        
S11 0.03238
S21 −0.00379
S22 0.00182       
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supply” on the probability of intermediate-fl exible regimes 
with respect to the fi xed regime. This might be interpreted 
as a sign of the inconsistent monetary policies that have 
been applied in Latin American over the last two decades.
Finally, results in Tables 3-5 show that the estimated 
variance and covariance terms of the random effects (S11, 
S12, S22) are in general very small, almost zero. As Von Hagen 
and Zhou (2007) point out such results could be interpreted 
as an indication that the models are largely capturing 
the determinants of countries’ choice and therefore, the 
infl uence from potential omitted variables is little.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have examined the impact of several 
macroeconomic variables related to OCA theory, types of 
shocks and vulnerability to currency crises on the choice 
Table 4 Latin America, 1980-2004. Types of shocks
Regime Coef. Std. Err. z P > z [95 % Conf. Interval]
Intermediate  −2.595325 0.452445 −5.74 0.000 −3.482100 −1.708550
cacc 0.068346 0.032508 2.10 0.036 0.004632 0.132060
inf −0.000003 0.000327 −0.01 0.992 −0.000644 0.000638
neer
toftrade 0.018363 0.018416 1.00 0.319 −0.017731 0.054457
d1 5.879678 0.626645 9.38 0.000 4.651476 7.107880
d2 3.353415 0.675082 4.97 0.000 2.030280 4.676551
        
Flexible  −3.615500 0.646659 −5.59 0.000 −4.882928 −2.348072
cacc 0.086560 0.043574 1.99 0.047 0.001157 0.171962
inf 0.000052 0.000618 0.08 0.933 −0.001160 0.001263
neer 0.00350 0.00145 2.42 0.015 0.00067 0.00634
toftrade 0.000973 0.022871 0.04 0.966 −0.043854 0.045800
d1 4.418351 0.825681 5.35 0.000 2.800046 6.036656
d2 6.627213 0.760783 8.71 0.000 5.136106 8.118320
        
S11 0.17486
S21 −0.02108
S22 0.00254       
Table 5 Latin America, 1980-2004. Vulnerability to crises
Regime Coef. Std. Err. z P > z [95 % Conf. Interval]
Intermediate  −2.248722 0.576949 −3.90 0.000 −3.379521 −1.117923
fb −0.000890 0.001222 −0.73 0.467 −0.003286 0.001506
fxdebt −0.000003 0.000327 −0.01 0.992 −0.000644 0.000638
netfxexp −0.001009 0.000518 −1.95 0.051 −0.002024 0.000006
M2gdp −0.003759 0.001114 −3.37 0.001 −0.005943 −0.001576
crisis 1.748476 0.601211 2.91 0.004 0.570125 2.926828
d1 5.688675 0.626550 9.08 0.000 4.460660 6.916690
d2 3.901544 0.778401 5.01 0.000 2.375906 5.427181
        
Flexible  −2.993492 0.768196 −3.90 0.000 −4.499129 −1.487855
fb 0.003923 0.003689 1.06 0.288 −0.003307 0.011153
fxdebt
netfxexp −0.001539 0.001233 −1.25 0.212 −0.003956 0.000878
M2gdp −0.002954 0.000939 −3.15 0.002 −0.004795 −0.001113
crisis 0.306635 0.711732 0.43 0.667 −1.088335 1.701604
d1 4.306499 0.864147 4.98 0.000 2.612802 6.000195
d2 6.950929 0.904814 7.68 0.000 5.177528 8.724331
        
S11 0.27289
S21 −0.01840
S22 0.00124       
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of exchange rate regime (fi xed, intermediate and fl exible). 
Particularly, we have used a panel mixed multinomial logit 
model to the choices of ERR in 21 Latin American countries 
for the period 1980-2004.
First, none of the tested models seem to provide a 
reasonable explanation for the choice of exchange rate 
regime, consistent with the conclusion of the recent paper 
by Rose (2011). Thus, we should stress the importance of 
the previous ERR choice to explain the current regime, 
which seems to confi rm the existence of a strong inertia in 
the choice of the exchange rate regime.
Secondly and regarding to OCA variables, we have 
observed that those countries with higher levels of Gross 
Domestic Product per capita and openness are more likely 
to choose fl exible exchange rate regimes, contrasting the 
OCA theory. Larger tendency to fl exibility is also shown in 
the case of current account defi cit.
Third, the existence of currency crises in previous periods 
seems to increase the tendency to fl exibility, whereas the 
variable that represents the fear of floating, “external 
debt”, shows its infl uence in the opposite direction. Finally, 
the negative coefficient of “money supply” might be 
interpreted as a sign of the inconsistent monetary policies 
that have been applied in Latin American over the last two 
decades.
In order to improve these fi rst results certain issues must 
be considered: on one hand, the inclusion of institutional 
and political variables as possible explanatory factors; on 
the other hand, checking the robustness of the results with 
alternative specifi cations of the dependent variable, as well 
as the analysis of the sensitivity of results using different 
samples of countries.
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